Institutional Theory: Problems and Prospects by Peters, B. Guy
IHS Political Science Series
Working Paper 69
July 2000
Institutional Theory: Problems and 
Prospects
B. Guy Peters
Impressum
Author(s):
B. Guy Peters
Title:
Institutional Theory: Problems and Prospects
ISSN: Unspecified 
2000 Institut für Höhere Studien - Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Josefstädter Straße 39, A-1080 Wien
E-Mail:  o ce@ihs.ac.atﬃ  
Web: ww   w .ihs.ac.  a  t 
All IHS Working Papers are available online: http://irihs.  ihs.  ac.at/view/ihs_series/   
This paper is available for download without charge at: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/1273/
  
Institutional Theory: 
Problems and Prospects 
B. Guy Peters 
69 
Reihe Politikwissenschaft 
Political Science Series 
  
  
 
 
69 
Reihe Politikwissenschaft 
Political Science Series 
Institutional Theory: 
Problems and 
Prospects 
B. Guy Peters 
 
July 2000 
 
Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien 
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna 
  
Contact: 
 
Prof. Dr. B. Guy Peters 
University of Pittsburgh, Department of Political Science 
4L01 Forbes Quadrangle, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 
(: 001-412- 648-7250 
email: bgpeters@vms.cis.pitt.edu 
 
Founded in 1963 by two prominent Austrians living in exile – the sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld and the 
economist Oskar Morgenstern with the financial support from the Ford Foundation, the Austrian 
Federal Ministry of Education, and the City of Vienna, the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) is the 
first institution for postgraduate education and research in economics and the social sciences in 
Austria. The Political Science Series presents research done at the Department of Political Science 
and aims to share “work in progress” before formal publication. It includes papers by the Department’s 
teaching and research staff, visiting professors, graduate students, visiting fellows, and invited
participants in seminars, workshops, and conferences. As  usual, authors bear full responsibility for the 
content of their contributions. 
 
 
Das Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) wurde im Jahr 1963 von zwei prominenten Exilösterreichern –
dem Soziologen Paul F. Lazarsfeld und dem Ökonomen Oskar Morgenstern – mit Hilfe der Ford-
Stiftung, des Österreichischen Bundesministeriums für Unterricht und der Stadt Wien gegründet und ist 
somit die erste nachuniversitäre Lehr- und Forschungsstätte für die Sozial- und Wirtschafts-
wissenschaften in Österreich. Die Reihe Politikwissenschaft bietet Einblick in die Forschungsarbeit 
der Abteilung für Politikwissenschaft und verfolgt das Ziel, abteilungsinterne Diskussionsbeiträge einer 
breiteren fachinternen Öffentlichkeit zugänglich zu machen. Die inhaltliche Verantwortung für die 
veröffentlichten Beiträge liegt bei den Autoren und Autorinnen. Gastbeiträge werden als solche 
gekennzeichnet. 
 
Abstract 
Institutional theory in political science has made great advances in recent years, but also has 
a number of significant theoretical and methodological problems. The most important of 
these problems is the generally static nature of institutional explanations. Also, there is a 
nagging problem of the difficulties in measuring institutional variables in other than simplistic, 
nominal categories. As well as discussing these problems this paper addresses the static 
nature of institutional theory by examining the concept of “institutionalization”, and the 
creation (and tearing down) of institutional structures. The paper argues that by considering 
institutionalization as a continuous variable rather than a nominal variable we can begin to 
understand better the dynamics of institutions themselves, and therefore also develop better 
institutional explanations for other social and political phenomena. 
Zusammenfassung 
Die theoretische Perspektive des Institutionalismus war in den letzten Jahren sehr 
erfolgreich, weist aber immer noch einige wesentliche theoretische und methodologische 
Probleme auf. Eines dieser Probleme ist, daß Institutionalismus oft sehr unbeweglich wirkt. 
Ein weiteres Problem bezieht sich auf die Schwierigkeiten Institutionen zu messen. Diese 
Probleme werden im vorliegenden Papier diskutiert und das Konzept der 
“Institutionalisierung” kritisch beleuchtet, mit dem Ziel die Dynamik des Vorganges besser zu 
begreifen und bessere Erklärungen für soziale und politische Phänomene mit Hilfe des 
Institutionalismus zu erzielen. 
  
 
Contents 
Zusammenfassung 5 
1. Conceptual Confusion: Perhaps Not so Great? 2 
1.1 Approaches to Institutionalism...................................................................................2 
1.2 How Much Difference is There?.................................................................................4 
2. Institutional Change 7 
2.1 Distinguishing Two Types of Institutional Change.........................................................7 
2.2 Systems Theory and Institutionalization......................................................................9 
2.3 Changing Values and Structures .............................................................................10 
3. Measurement: What is An Institution? 11 
4. Independent or Dependent Variable, or Both? 13 
5. Summary: What Does it Explain? How Does it Explain? 14 
6. References 15 
I H S — B. Guy Peters / Institutional Theory: Problems and Prospects — 1 
The past decade and a half have seen a major reassertion of institutional theories in the 
social sciences, and especially in political science. The March and Olsen (1984) article in the 
APSR was the beginning of the revolution against the methodological individualism of both 
behavioralism and rational choice approaches. Following from that and their subsequent 
publications (1989; 1994; Brunsson and Olsen, 1993; Olsen and Peters, 1996) there has 
been a proliferation of institutional theories and applications of those theories. Similarly, in 
economics (North, 1990; Alston, Eggerston and North, 1996; Khalil, 1995) and in sociology 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995; Zucker, 1987) there has been a birth (or more 
appropriately a resurrection) of institutional approaches to the basic questions in these 
disciplines. 
While this proliferation of interest is gratifying for those of us who never really gave up on the 
utility of the institution as an explanatory concept, it also presents some important analytic 
and theoretical problems. This paper will examine the nature of contemporary institutional 
theory and will focus on questions concerning its coherence and its potential utility as a 
central organizing approach for political science. There is no need for the domination of one 
approach or another in a large and diverse discipline dealing with equally diverse versions of 
government. It is clear, however, that the advocates of rational choice approaches are 
attempting to impose that orthodoxy on the discipline. The question then becomes whether 
institutionalism has sufficient analytic power to be a worthy counterpoint to that one attempt 
to create hegemony. 
It is not only the apparent theoretical inconsistency within institutionalism that presents 
problems for extending this mode of political analysis. There are also important empirical 
problems when we attempt to utilize institutionalism as an organizing theory for political 
science. In particular, measurement of institutions and variations in their characteristics pose 
perhaps the greatest challenge to the use of these several theories in a more systematic 
manner. We assume a priori that institutions make sense as an explanatory variable; the 
problems arise when attempt to specify what about them matters, and how they exert their 
influence on the dependent variables (usually policy).    
As we will point out below, for some versions of institutionalism the measurements are 
obvious and border on the trivial; the question of measurement is simply what are the formal 
structures and what can differences among those structures predict. For other versions of 
this approach the possibilities for measurement are more ambiguous and apparently more 
remote from any common sense meaning of institutionalism. If we are to continue to follow 
the canons of the conventional social sciences, and especially develop a comparative 
political theory, then we must be able to cope with institutions on more than an abstract, 
theoretical level and develop measures that enable testing of the predictions derived from 
institutional theory.  
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1. Conceptual Confusion: Perhaps Not so Great? 
Potentially the most important impediment to a more central position for institutionalism is 
that the term means so many things to different scholars, and that some of the alternative 
approaches are not only different but even contradictory (see Hall and Taylor, 1996; Kato, 
1995). If one adopts some versions of the institutional approach he or she may have very 
different empirical evidence, and make very different predictions about behavior, than if one 
were doing research using another version. This is true even though this research is 
conducted using what is nominally the same theoretical approach. A central question then is 
just how much of an impediment these internal differences are and what if anything can be 
done to generate a more unified approach for institutional theory. 
1.1 Approaches to Institutionalism 
We should begin here with some description and analysis of the basic institutional 
approaches. I have already done this at book length (Peters, 1999a), but a brief description 
of the major approaches is required at this point in order to make the rest of the discussion 
more comprehensible. The above mentioned book dealt with seven versions of 
institutionalism, but we will only deal with six of those here, and focus attention on only four. 
In this paper we will not discuss sociological institutionalism, given that it is concerned more 
with the questions of another, if allied, discipline.1 We will also spend relatively little time in 
describing and discussing international regimes (Rittenberger, 1993) and interest groups 
(Knoke, Pappi and Tsujinaka, 1996; Kickert, Klijn and Koopenjaan, 1997) as institutions. 
These two versions are, in many ways, more applications of institutional logics to particular 
settings, just as there also are papers in this conference devoted to applications of the basic 
ideas of institutionalism to a number of different settings. 
The first of the major approaches to institutional analysis is the normative approach 
advocated by March and Olsen (1984; 1989; 1996). They argue that the best way to 
understand political behavior (seemingly both individual and collective) is through a “logic of 
appropriateness” that individuals acquire through their membership in institutions. They 
contrast this normative logic with the “logic of consequentiality” that is central to rational 
choice theories. That is, March and Olsen argue that people functioning within institutions 
behave as they do because of normative standards rather than because of their desire to 
maximize individual utilities. Further, these standards of behavior are acquired through 
involvement with one or more institutions and the institutions are the major social 
repositories of values.  
                                                 
1 Further, the March and Olsen approach draws heavily on some aspects of sociological institutionalism, 
particularly the work of Selznick and his students. 
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Although March and Olsen might find it difficult to accept, there is also a rational choice 
version of institutionalism; in fact there are several variations on this general theme.2  The 
underlying logic of rational choice institutionalism is that institutions are arrangements of 
rules and incentives, and the members of the institutions behave in response to those basic 
components of institutional structure. Unlike individuals in normative institutionalism the 
preferences of the occupants of these structures do not have their preferences modified by 
membership in the institution. Rather, the individuals who interact with the institutions have 
their own well ordered sets of preferences that remains largely unchanged by any 
institutional involvement they may have.  
Historical institutionalism is the third of the approaches to be discussed in this paper. The 
argument of this approach is that the policy and structural choices made at the inception of 
the institution will have a persistent influence over its behavior for the remainder of its 
existence (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992). This idea of “path dependency” is the 
central explanatory principle for the historical institutionalists, although they are also very 
interested in the ideas that help to shape and to sustain the directions of policy (Hall, 1986; 
King, 1996). This approach is obviously well-suited to explaining the persistence of policies 
but is much less promising as a means of explaining change in policies or structures. 
The final version of institutionalism we will be discussing will be termed empirical 
institutionalism. This term is employed to describe a body of literature that asks the 
deceptively simple question of whether institutions make any difference in policy choices, or 
in political stability. The definition of institutions utilized in this literature is rather a common 
sense one, emphasizing the formal structures of government. In particular, this literature has 
focussed on the differences between presidential and parliamentary governments (Weaver 
and Rockman, 1993; Von Mettenheim, 1996). This is a very old debate in political science, 
but the institutionalist discussion has elaborated the discussion and demonstrated its 
possibilities for theoretical development. 
Like the rational choice version of institutionalism there is yet another version of empirical 
institutionalism. This version, associated initially with Samuel Huntington, is even more basic 
than the presidential/parliamentary debate.3 Huntington argued for the importance of 
institutions, without specifying clearly what those institutions were (1965; 1968). Huntington's 
concern was with the creation of structures that intermediated between the generation of 
demands in society and the government itself. Huntington appeared to be concerned 
primarily with formal government institutions but the same logic appears in some of Robert 
Putnam's arguments (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993) for the importance of structures 
                                                 
2 I argue that there are three distinct versions of rational choice institutionalism: principal-agent models (Horn, 
1995); game theoretical approaches (Calvert, 1995), and rules-based models (Ostrom, 1990). 
3 In sociology one can find some of the same sort of analysis in the work of S. N. Eisenstadt (1963; 1967). 
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in civil society for developing stable and effective democracy. Although heavily empirical 
also, this version of institutional analysis does not have the rather simplistic (Weaver and 
Rockman, 1993) concern with only a single type of institutional variation, but rather spreads 
the empirical net much wider. 4  
 In some ways the empirical version of institutionalism is similar to rational choice versions in 
that institutions are conceptualized as exogenous to the values of the individuals functioning 
within them. This statement means that it is assumed that individual values will not be 
altered by involvement with the institution. Behavior will change in response to the 
assortment of opportunities and constraints presented by the structure, but the values that 
condition that behavior are assumed to be unaffected by the institution. This assumption is 
found in both versions of empirical institutionalism discussed above, although more explicit in 
the simpler arguments of the presidential v. parliamentary government debate. 
1.2 How Much Difference is There? 
The discussion to this point has concentrated on the characteristics of the individual 
institutional approaches, and therefore has necessarily stressed the differences existing 
among the approaches. The most basic question, therefore, is whether there is a sufficient 
intellectual core to justify an argument that there is indeed a single institutional approach 
within the several variations. The question then becomes one of judging whether that core 
can be serve as a unifying approach to the discipline of political science. 
The answer to this basic question must be both yes and no. There are some features that do 
unify the approach but at the same time there are also important differences. The unifying 
features are, I will argue, adequate to provide the beginning of a more unified approach, but 
there is still the need to develop that approach and to think more explicitly about the 
theoretical core (for one, highly normative, version see Immergut, 1998). This is not an 
argument to spend all our time theorizing about institutions; quite the contrary. The need is to 
interact the theoretical concerns with empirical and sectoral analyses. as is being done in 
this conference, and to use the interaction to refine the theory as well as the empirical 
analysis. 
The most important argument binding these various approaches is that structures – however 
defined – do matter. At their simplest these structures are the formal structures of 
government, defined as presidential or parliamentary. The historical institutionalist version is 
a  little more complex, but still is a rather common sense notion of a formal structure that 
persists across time. For March and Olsen structure appears to be both a formalized 
                                                 
4 A trawl through the papers at the APSA this year yielded literally dozens of papers that purported to provide “  
institutional explanations”    but most merely meant that there were some minor differences in structure, rather than 
any theoretical understanding of institutions.  
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organizational apparatus and also the pattern of the values that those structures possess 
and inculcate into new members (March and Olsen, 1989); the historical institutionalists also 
are very much concerned with the influence of ideas on institutions and may speak of 
structures in ideational terms. For the rational choice advocates, on the other hand, 
structures are composed of incentives and/or constraints on behaviors. Being rational 
animals individuals are assumed to respond to those factors in the structure of the institution. 
Another factor that tends to unify institutional analysis is that structures persist while 
individuals come and go. Thus, even though individuals appear to be the primary animator in 
the rational choice version of institutionalism, the institutions in question do appear to enjoy 
some existence outside of those individuals (but see below). This persistence is obviously 
central to the historical institutionalists, to the point of creating a perhaps excessively static 
conception of institutionalism. Similarly, the March and Olsen version of institutionalism 
assumes that institutions persist and that they attempt to replicate themselves by socializing 
new members into the values that define the institution. The important point is that we must 
what motivates political behavior over time, as well as understanding the more immediate 
pressures for action and change. 
Following from the above two points, institutionalism also argues that structures (institutions) 
create greater regularity of human behavior than would otherwise exist and therefore 
enhance the explanatory and predictive capacity of the social sciences. Even if the rational 
choice approach depends primarily on individual utility functions and rational calculations 
based on those utilities the presence of on-going institutions enables the external researcher 
to predict behaviors and to test hypotheses that might not be possible without the presence 
of the structures. This is, of course, also the more practical point that Huntington was making 
about political development – institutions create the predictable, regular behavior necessary 
for a peaceful and effective political system. 
All the above about the unifying aspects of institutional theory having been said, there are 
some obvious theoretical problems in this literature. These problems arise because of the 
multiple understandings of what an institution is, and about the factors that shape behavior 
within institutions. One central issue that arises here concerns the source of preferences, 
and the ways in which individuals and institutions interact in making decisions and forming 
judgements about “good” policies. On the one hand March and Olsen argue vigorously that 
preferences are endogenous, based on the experiences of the individual within the 
institution. At the other end of an implicit spectrum the rational choice approach argues that 
preferences are exogenous, and do not change appreciably because of involvement with an 
institution.  
The other two approaches are less specific on this matter, although the historical 
institutionalists appear closer to the March and Olsen view and the empirical approach 
appears closer to the rational choice perspective. The historical institutionalists, for example, 
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focus on the role of values in defining institutions and implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) 
focus on the way in which those values 
Another important question is the extent to which the different approaches consider 
institutions to be malleable. We will spend quite a bit of space below discussing institutional 
change, but the question here is not about how does change occur but rather about the ease 
with which change may be brought about. On this issue also the approaches can be very far 
apart. On the one hand the rational choice version tends to see change as quite easy; all 
one needs to do is to change the incentives (e.g. the pay-off matrix of the game) and 
behavior will almost immediately change. This assumption help to explain why there has 
been so much greater interest in institutional design among rational choice theorists (see 
Weimer, 1995; Goodin, 1995; Keman, 1996). If individuals can be expected to respond to 
incentives and constraints in predictable ways then design is rather simple  
At the other end of this dimension of malleability the historical institutionalists assume that 
change is difficult at best, and likewise that change is very difficult to plan and design. In the 
historical view change comes about primarily through “punctuations” in the equilibrium that 
characterizes institutions in this view (see Krasner, 1984; 1988). Institutional design, given 
the uncontrollability of change, is a virtual impossibility. The other two approaches fall 
between these two extremes in the ease of change. The normative version of institutionalism 
tends to see change as rather difficult, involving as it does changing values that have taken 
some time to build into the institutions (see Brunsson and Olsen, 1993), while the empirical 
approach actually has very little to say about the malleability of institutions. 
Thus, the degree of integration (and potentially therefore the degree of utility) of 
institutionalism may depend upon one sees the glass as half full or half empty. There are 
some important unifying features, and these help to press home the most central argument 
that structure does matter. On the other hand, however, it is not at all clear how structure 
does matter, and how those structures affect the behavior of individuals functioning within 
them. One way to proceed in developing institutional theory, therefore, is to accept the 
inherent ambiguity of this body of theory as it currently exists, and indeed to revel in that 
diversity rather than deploring it. Just as Allison (1971) did for approaches to decision-
making in organizations so too can we utilize these various versions of institutionalisms as a 
set of lenses to illuminate different aspects of political structures and political behavior (see 
for example Peters, 1999b). They all say something important about what institutions are, 
and they each also have important blind spots. 
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2. Institutional Change 
We have already undertaken some discussion of institutional change, but the problem is a 
sufficiently important one in this body of theory to devote some greater attention to it. One 
standard critique of institutional theory has been that it is almost inherently static while the 
world of politics, which it seeks to explain, is almost inherently dynamic. While that critique 
easily can be exaggerated, there is a certain amount of validity in it. Institutional theories do 
tend to be “variance” theories, and are better at explaining differences among types of 
institutions than in explaining the development of one or another individual institution.5  
The critique of an inherently static nature is perhaps especially applicable to the empirical 
approach, as the epitome of Mohr's “variance” theory of organizations. The question being 
asked here is simply if existing types of structure make any differences in the types of 
decisions taken by those institutions. On the other hand the normative version of 
institutionalism cultivated by March and Olsen tends to focus more on the individual 
institution and the way in which it develops its internal, common “logic of appropriateness”, 
This version is not most fundamentally concerned with change but it does have a very clear 
concern with institutional development. 
2.1 Distinguishing Two Types of Institutional Change 
The above comment about development within an institution points to the need to consider 
two types of institutional change. One is internal development of the institution, or a process 
of institutionalization (and also possibly deinstitutionalization). The other type of change is 
change in the values and/or structures that are assumed to characterize the institutions. 
Thus, especially in the rational choice version, an institution can remain well-institutionalized 
but through changing the incentives being offered it can alter its nature and its impact on the 
individuals with which it interacts. 
The institutionalization argument, therefore, is that institutions must become institutions; 
being an institution is a variable not a constant, and not all are as fully institutionalized as are 
others. For example, a new civil service system created in a post-socialist country may have 
had some of the formal structural attributes of similar institutions elsewhere, but would not 
yet have developed the value structure or the autonomy that would enable us to typify it as 
fully institutionalized civil service system. Selznick (1957) argued that institutionalization 
involves “infusing a structure with value”, so in the case of emerging civil services it would be 
argued that the structures must be animated by the appropriate values, not just have formal 
                                                 
5 Mohr (1982; see also Zucker, 1977) distinguishes organizational theories as being variance theories or process 
theories. The latter type of theory  
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structures than could be recognized as being like those in long-standing democracies 
(Verheijen, 1999). 
The assessment of the state of an institution must, of course be more than a judgment call 
and we therefore need to develop some criteria to assess the extent of institutionalization. 
One set of criteria of institutionalization has been advanced by Samuel Huntington, who 
argues that there are four dimensions through which we can judge the level of 
institutionalization of any structure that we observe: autonomy, adaptability, complexity, and 
coherence. These four have been applied to several types of institutional arrangements 
(Polsby, 1968; Ragsdale and Theis, 1998) and they do provide one avenue for 
understanding the transformation that structures must make in order to survive, and to be 
able to influence their members and their environment.  
Taken rather briefly and simply these four concepts can be understood in the following ways: 
1. Autonomy represents a concern with the capacity of institutions to make and implement 
their own decisions. Arguably, to the extent that they are not dependent upon another 
organization or institution they can be said to be institutionalized. This concept might be 
operationalized in terms of budgets and autonomous sources of revenue;  
2. Adaptability taps the extent to which an institution is capable of adapting to changes in 
the environment, or more importantly capable of molding that environment. As with 
open systems approaches to social life the institution should be able to continue to 
import needed resources despite changes in the relevant environment; 
3. Complexity demonstrates the capacity of the institution to construct internal structures 
to fulfill its goals and to cope with the environment. Again, this conception is analogous 
to thinking in systems theory and structural-functionalism that discussed the importance 
of structural differentiation (see Almond and Powell, 1967); 
4. Coherence represents the capacity of the institution to manage its own workload and to 
develop procedures to process tasks in a timely a reasonable manner. This also 
represents a capacity of the institution to make decisions about its core tasks and 
beliefs and to filter out diversions from those. 
These four attributes may help in the difficult task of measuring the degree of 
institutionalization, and hence of measuring institutions themselves. That having been said, 
several of the variables mentioned above may be more manifestations of institutionalization 
having occurred, rather than the indicators of the concept itself. That is, organizations 
become autonomous because they are well institutionalized, so that autonomy indicates the 
existence of the concept “institutionalization” but it is not a measure of that concept – fever is 
not the disease, only an indication that some disease or another exists.  
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Institutionalization itself may be better represented by the complexity and coherence 
dimensions that indicate the internal management capacity of the structure in question. 
Another way to conceptualize institutionalization may be the standardization of procedures 
and the routinization of practices within the organization. Brunsson (1999), for example, 
argues that this process of standardization of procedures is central to the creation and 
maintenance of institutions. So long as there substantial internal variation there can not be 
said to be an institution operative in the field.  
Although the four concepts derived from Huntington's disucssion of institutinal development, 
as well as from the other students of institutionalization are useful they may not capture all 
the complexity of institutionalization. Two additional factors (see Goetz and Peters, 1999) 
appear important in defining institutionalization in contemporary public sector structures. 
These two factors are: 
5. Congruence. This variable reflects a concern with the extent to which relationships 
within political institutions match the social relations they are supposed to regularize 
and maintain. If political institutions are not congruent then they can not be expected to 
survive and be effective. Also, this reflects a concern about differences between the 
values of poltiical elites and the values of the masses. 
6. Exclusivity.  The final variable related to the intensity of functional competition among 
institutions. When there is little or no competition then the institutions can expect long-
term survival. When there are multiple institutions attempting to perform the same tasks 
then the competition will have to be resolved in some way, often by the termination of 
one or more institutions. 
2.2 Systems Theory and Institutionalization 
Another way to address institutionalization is to revive the systems theory that has been 
used in organizational analysis (Katz and Kahn, 1978), as well as in a number of other areas 
of social science (Easton, 1970). In this theory, organizations are defined in terms of their 
capacity to create and maintain a boundary from the environment and from other 
organizations. All organizations must import resources from the environment but the more 
institutionalized are hypothesized to have effective gatekeepers to control those 
transactions. 
We will return to the measurement question in a later section of the paper, but the 
conceptual issue is more important here – one aspect of institutional change is in the 
creation of institutions, and not all institutions are as fully formed as are others. Likewise, 
institutions may deinstitutionalize, and become less autonomous, or less coherent. These 
changes in the attributes of institutions may predict something of their own behavior, as well 
as their effects on policy. 
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2.3 Changing Values and Structures 
The second aspect of institutional change is changing the content of what institutions do, or 
what they believe. Here there are marked differences among the approaches, with the 
rational choice versions standing out in their assumptions of the ease of change. For the 
other approaches, however, change is a real problem if institutional analysis is to be an 
organizing concept for political science. The stereotypical conception of institutionalism is 
that it is at best static, and even if it can provide useful explanations of different policy 
outcomes or different types of decisions, it can not provide an explanation for change. 
The above discussion is to some extent a restatement of the familiar structure/agency 
problem in constructing social theory (Callinicos, 1989; Hay, 1995). Should we focus on 
structure and thereby run the risk of hyperstability in our explanations, or do we focus on 
agents of change and thereby encounter the risk of unpredictability and instability in our 
understanding of the social world? Both of these horns of the dilemma can be overstated, 
but broadly this is the type of choice that social theory inevitably must confront. 
We have elsewhere (Peters and Pierre, 1998) attempted to address some of the theoretical 
issues that the potentially static nature of institutions presents. The argument there was that 
the dichotomy between structure and agency was usually phrased much too starkly, 
especially by the critics of institutional theory. While structure may be seen as constraints on 
unfettered creativity of action by individuals also shape structures. The effects of the Clinton 
administration on the office of President of the United States is an obvious example. The 
office will never be the same, but the same could be said off the effects of a number of other 
presidents as well. These political structures have evolved along with the individuals who 
inhabit and animate them, and both institutions and individuals are shaped in the 
interaction.6 
The argument about structure and agency can also run the other way. Agency is not as 
unbridled as the advocates of individual agency as an explanatory device might have us 
believe. Few, if any, public sector actors can act without confronting powerful constraints 
from the institutions within which they operate. Individuals may have substantial charisma 
and other political resources but they can only be successful if the can channel those 
resources within known and effective institutions. There are the relatively few exceptions who 
have been able to revolutionize the political system but even then, in good Weberian fashion, 
that charisma does become institutionalized. 
                                                 
6 Grafstein argues that one of the central paradoxes of institutionalism is that institutions are the products of 
individual action but yet we assume that individuals somehow are powerless against institutions. 
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The fundamental point being made here is that institutions and individuals are involved in an 
ongoing process of interaction that produces change and even replacement of existing 
institutions (see Peters, 1999, 48–50). It is appropriate to focus on the stability of institutions 
and their capacity to explain policies through time, but it is probably inappropriate to dwell on 
that stability and assume that institutions impose a mortmain on the possibility of change. 
What is now required, however, is some means of measuring and describing institutions, and 
the nature of their values and incentives, in order to be able to assess not only the level of 
institutionalization but also the likely effects whey will have on policy.  
3. Measurement: What is An Institution? 
We argue above that measurement becomes crucial for addressing some of the problems of 
institutional theory. If we can sort out the conceptual confusion about what an institution 
actually is, we are still left with a very real problem about how to measure an institution. One 
obvious answer to this question is that each of the approaches implies a different form of 
measurement, so that there is no possible answer. The empirical institutionalists, for 
example, have been largely content with their simple dichotomy, although the political world 
is almost certainly more complex than that (Duverger, 1980; Lijphart, 1984); in some ways 
this is little changed from the “old institutionalists” who concentrated on formal-legal 
definitions of institutions.  
The historical institutionalists are responsible primarily for identifying what is the existing 
institutional arrangement, whether in policy or structural terms, so that this can be argued to 
persist or not. Even this measurement task, however, may not be so simple as it appears, 
given that we may be left with the familiar incrementalist problem of deciding how big a 
change is needed for there to be a change (Dempster and Wildavsky, 1980). 
Both the rational choice and the normative versions of institutional theory present more 
difficult measurement problems. The rational choice version requires identifying just what are 
constraints, imposed on, or the incentives available to, the participants in an institution. The 
notions of the payoffs available in, for example, game theory are generally hypothetical. 
Calvert (1995), for example, assigns some numbers to the payoff matrices in games of 
institutional design that are firmly anchored in thin air. There have been some interesting 
efforts to identify and calculate the incentives that motivate members of institutions in a 
rational choice framework (see Brehm and Gates, 1999), but these are relatively scarce.  
Alternatively, if the rules-based version of institutions is being used then there is the need to 
measure constraint, and with that the need to ask when is a rule really a rule? That is, tax 
laws in many Southern European countries may be rules but if they are not obeyed, and it is 
widely known and accepted that they are not obeyed, then are they really rules? Thus, the 
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means of measuring compliance are needed to determine if the institutions (conceptualized 
as rules) do in fact exist in anything other than a paper form.7 This problem, in turn, makes 
the existence of an institution almost tautological, and hence any measurement of content or 
degree becomes almost meaningless.  
The normative conceptualization of institutions requires measuring the values that exist 
within the institution, and the extent to which they are common throughout the institution. A 
useful exemplar for this variety of measurement would be the existing literature on 
organizational cultures (Martin and Siehl, 1983; Martin and Frost, 1996). This literature has 
provided the intellectual means for cataloging organizational cultures (Hofstede, 1990) and 
also has examined the extent to which a common culture exists within an organization or 
institution.8 Further, some literature has examined the ways in which organizational cultures 
are produced and reinforced in both the public and private sectors. 
The research required to measure institutions within the normative framework could be 
conducted with questionnaires, through more in-depth interviews, or by using organizational 
artifacts (training manuals, internal communications, etc.). It is, however, more than possible 
to assess the existence of a institutional culture and to typify it. Typifying that culture may 
involve examining the management content and/or at the policy aspects, especially for public 
sector institutions responsible for making and implementing particular types of policy. Both of 
these dimensions help to understand how the institution functions and how it relates to its 
external environment. 
The measurement question is in many ways a continuation of the discussion about levels of 
institutionalization presented above. That is, if we believe think we know what an institution is 
we can begin to develop a group of measures to capture the most important aspects of that 
social reality, but if we do not have a clear view of the concept then measurement is stifled. 
Assuming simply that an institution exists, or that it does not, does not appear to offer 
sufficient guidance for constructing social measurement schemes.  
 On the other hand, beginning to develop and actually use measures of institutions, albeit 
preliminary and potentially flawed, may be necessary to amplify the meanings of the theories 
more completely. Although Giovanni Sartori (1991) and other scholars have long argued that 
measurement without adequate conceptualization is at best unlikely to yield useful results, 
there is something to be said for bashing ahead and at least attempting alternative ways of 
measuring an institution and its attributes. So long as the study of institutions remains at the 
extremely abstract level as it now stands then the multiple approaches all remain equally 
                                                 
7 There is a large literature on compliance in organizations, as well as about the manner in which citizens respond 
to public laws such a taxes. 
8 One theoretical question we are not tackling here is the difference between institutions and organizations (See 
Zucker, 1987; Khalil, 1995; Peters, 2000). 
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valid. Some more detailed testing of propositions and assumptions may be required before 
we can fully clear away the conceptual swamp in which this area of the discipline often 
appears to be mired. 
The measurement question is especially important as we think about institutionalism as a 
basis for developing comparative political theory (assuming for the moment that there is any 
other kind). We have noted above that a good deal of institutional theory could be 
characterized as “variance theories”, meaning that the structural differences among 
institutions are assumed to predict differences in policy choices, or the stability of the 
governmental structures. If we are to move beyond simple dichotomies and to be able to 
make more precise predictions about performance then more precise measures will the 
necessary. For example, if we are interested in the impact of executive politics on policy and 
performance then we will need to go beyond the difference between presidential and 
parliamentary systems (see Goetz and Peters, 1999).   
4. Independent or Dependent Variable, or Both? 
The general assumption in the literature has been that institutions are independent variables. 
In the empirical version of the approach there has been a good deal of analysis attempting to 
demonstrate that differences in institutions do make a difference in policy (Weaver and 
Rockman, 1995). The nature of political theory is indeed to provide explanations for a broad 
range of political phenomena, and much of the discussion in this paper has been about the 
explanatory capacity of institutional theory. 
We should, however, also think about institutions as dependent variables, and question what 
can explain the choice, or autonomous development, of an institution. This need to think 
about institutions in both ways is not dissimilar to some aspects of behavioral theory; 
attitudes, for example, are both independent and dependent variables. The purpose of 
thinking about institutions as dependent variables is linked with the question of institutional 
development and institutionalization mentioned above. In particular, are these structures 
inherently the product of an evolutionary process, or are they amenable to design and 
manipulation. Further, if they are the product of a more evolutionary process, then what 
explains that process?  
Associated with possibilities of thinking about institutions in political life is the need to 
conceptualize the relationship between the political environment and institutions. All versions 
of institutionalism we have discussed have a more or less central conception of institutions 
acting rather autonomously in making policy; the measures of institutionalization discussed 
above assume that autonomy is an essential element of institutionalization. On the other 
hand, however, in democratic systems institutions must also be closely connected with the 
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environment and respond to the legitimate pressures coming from outside. Thus, although 
internally institutionalization may be a positive virtue then . 
5. Summary: What Does it Explain? How Does it 
Explain? 
We have now had a discussion of a number of issues in institutional theory, but we must 
return to the central question of whether institutional theory can function as an organizing 
approach for the discipline. Posing this question does not mean that it would necessarily be 
the only or even the dominant approach, but is there sufficient power and generality to think 
about institutionalism in these terms? In other words, can institutional analysis explain a 
range of phenomena in political life, and do so in a parsimonious manner?  
The answer to the above question is a definitive yes and no. On the one hand institutions 
can be discerned existing within a wide range of political settings, and performing a wide 
range of public tasks. Also, institutions appear volte face to be associated with differences in 
behavior of individuals and differences in decision-making outcomes. Institutions also help in 
reducing variance in political behavior and therefore help to improve the possibilities of 
prediction. Likewise, institutions are more readily identifiable (at least under most definitions 
of the term) so that they comprise a useful point at which to begin the analysis.  
The critics would argue, however, that even if institutional theory does constitute a good 
place at which to begin the analysis, they are not such a good place to end it. There are a 
number of problems in the theory itself, and in its ability to provide coherent explanations of 
political phenomena, that limit its utility as a central framework for the discipline. One of the 
more important problems is the difficulty of measuring institutions; we know they exist but 
how do they vary? Further, such explanations as may be available from institutional theory 
may be excessively static, and be incapable of coping with the dynamism and complexity of 
the contemporary political world.  
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